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Abstract
This paper introduces a deterministic Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm that relies on a new weak coordinator. As opposed to previous
algorithms that cannot terminate in the presence of a faulty or slow
coordinator, our algorithm can terminate even when its coordinator
is faulty, hence the name weak coordinator. The key idea is to allow
processes to complete asynchronous rounds as soon as they receive a
threshold of messages, instead of having to wait for a message from a
coordinator that may be slow.
The resulting algorithm assumes partial synchrony, is resilience op-
timal, time optimal and does not need signatures. Our presentation
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is didactic: we first present a simple safe binary Byzantine consensus
algorithm, modify it to ensure termination, and finally present an op-
timized reduction from multivalue consensus to binary consensus that
may terminate in 4 message delays.
To evaluate our algorithm, we deployed it on 100 machines dis-
tributed in 5 datacenters across different continents and compared its
performance against the randomized solution from Moste´faoui, Moumem
and Raynal [PODC’14] that terminates in O(1) rounds in expectation.
Our algorithm always outperforms the latter even in the presence of
Byzantine behaviors. Our algorithm has a subsecond average latency
in most of our geo-distributed experiments, even when attacked by a
well-engineered coalition of Byzantine processes.
1 Introduction and Related Work
To circumvent the impossibility of solving consensus in asynchronous message-
passing systems [24] where processes can be faulty or Byzantine [31], re-
searchers typically use randomization [5, 6, 15] or additional synchrony as-
sumptions.
Randomized algorithms can use per-process “local” coins or a shared
“common” coin to solve consensus probabilistically among n processes de-
spite t < n3 Byzantine processes. When based on local coins, the existing
algorithms converge in O(n2.5) expected time [27]. A recent randomized
algorithm without signature [37] solves consensus in O(1) expected time
under a fair scheduler. The fair scheduler assumption was later relaxed in
an extended version [38] that we refer to as Coin in the remainder of the
paper. Unfortunately, implementing a common coin increases the message
complexity of the consensus algorithm.
To avoid the need of a common coin and solve the consensus problem de-
terministically, researchers have assumed partial or eventual synchrony [22].
Interestingly, these solutions typically require a unique coordinator process,
sometimes called a leader, to be non-faulty [3, 8, 16, 21, 22, 28, 32, 34]. The
advantage is that if the coordinator is non-faulty and if the messages are
delivered in a timely manner in an asynchronous round, then the coordina-
tor broadcasts its proposal to all processes and this value is decided after a
constant number of message delays. The drawback is that a faulty coordi-
nator can dramatically impact the algorithm performance by leveraging the
power it has in a round and imposing its value to all. Non-faulty processes
thus have no other choices but to decide nothing in this round.
In this paper, we present a weak coordinator alternative that does not
suffer from this drawback. It allows us to introduce a new deterministic
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Byzantine consensus algorithm that is time optimal, resilience optimal and
does not need signatures. As opposed to a classic (strong) coordinator, the
weak coordinator does not impose its value. On the one hand, this allows
non-faulty processes to decide a value quickly without the help of the coordi-
nator. On the other hand, the coordinator helps the algorithm terminating
if non-faulty processes know that they proposed distinct values that might
all be decided. Furthermore, having a weak coordinator allows rounds to be
executed optimistically without waiting for a specific message. This differs
from classic BFT algorithms [16] that have to wait for a particular message
from their coordinator and sometimes have to recover from a slow network
or faulty coordinator.
To mitigate the problem of a slow or Byzantine coordinator, other ap-
proaches were previously explored. Some protocols progressively reduce the
time allocated to a coordinator to solve consecutive consensus instances
in order to force the change of a slow coordinator [4, 20]. While this still
requires a (strong) coordinator in each round, it favors the fastest coordi-
nator in successive rounds. An exponential information gathering tree was
used to terminate in t + 3 rounds without a coordinator [9]. Other solu-
tions [22,45] require at least O(t) rounds. By contrast our weak coordinator
only helps agreement by suggesting a value while still allowing termination
in a constant number of message delays and thus differs from the classic
coordinator [17, 22] or the eventual leader that cannot be implemented in
BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Application to consortium blockchains. To motivate our algorithm, we
study its applicability to the recent context of blockchains [40]. Blockchains
originally aimed at tracking ownerships of digital assets where any Internet
user could solve a cryptopuzzle before proposing, for consensus, a block
of asset transactions. The consortium blockchains [12] became promising
at reducing the amount of resources consumed by avoiding to resolve the
cryptopuzzle but restricting the set of proposers to n known processes.
These consortium blockchains seem similar to replicated state machines [30,
44] where a sequence of commands must be decided by multiple processes.
Some blockchains already use Byzantine fault tolerant consensus, for exam-
ple, Hyperledger [2] uses a consensus based on a classic coordinator [8], Hon-
eybadger [36] uses a randomized algorithm [37] and the Red Belly Blockchain [25]
uses a perliminary version of the algorithm we introduce here [19]. A slight
difference with state machine replication is that the block at index x of a
blockchain must embed the hash of the block decided at instance number
(x − 1). This relation between instances is interesting as it entails a natu-
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ral mechanism during a consensus instance for discarding fake proposals or,
instead, extracting a valid value out of various proposals.
We thus propose a variant of the consensus problem that allows us to
extend common definitions of Byzantine consensus, that either assume that
no value proposed only by Byzantine processes can be decided [18, 38, 39],
or that any value (i.e., possibly proposed by a Byzantine process) can be
decided [22, 26, 33, 34, 43]. Interestingly, the validity property we propose
allows a decided value to combine multiple proposals but is less strict than
interactive consistency [42] or vector consensus [41]: for example, it does
not require the decided value to combine at least t + 1 values proposed by
correct processes.
Geo-distributed experimentation with Byzantine coalitions. To val-
idate our expectations experimentally, we deployed our consensus algorithm
on 100 Amazon VMs located in 5 datacenters on different continents. We
also implemented “Coin” the recent randomized algorithm from Mouste´oui
et al. [37] used in the HoneyBadger blockchain [36] and demonstrated that
under all our workloads, our algorithm outperforms “Coin” that is known to
terminate in O(1) round in expectation. This is due to both the overhead of
the coin implementation that slows down every round and the risks of being
unlucky at tossing the coin by increasing the number of rounds needed to
decide.
As Byzantine behaviors are known to affect drastically performance of
(strong) coordinator-based consensus [4, 20], we also implemented 4 differ-
ent Byzantine attacks: Byz1 where Byzantine processes send a bit b where
the protocol specification expects them to send ¬b; Byz2 where Byzantine
processes are mute; Byz3 where Byzantine processes send a combination of
random and flipped values and Byz4 where Byzantine processes form a coali-
tion to limit the progress of non-faulty nodes from one round to another by
exploiting a Byzantine coordinator and sending messages without waiting.
Interestingly, the latency exceeds slightly the second only under the Byz3
attacks.
Finally, we combine our consensus algorithm with an optimized variant
of the reduction of multivalue to binary consensus of Ben-Or et al. [7] to
propose a novel Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerant (DBFT) consensus
algorithm applicable to consortium blockchains that terminates in 4 mes-
sages delays in the good case, when all non-faulty processes propose the
same value.
Roadmap. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the binary
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Byzantine consensus algorithm. Section 4 presents the consensus definition
and an application to the blockchain context and Section 5 concludes the
paper. The proofs of safety and termination as well as experimental results
are deferred to the appendix.
2 A Byzantine Computation Model
Asynchronous processes. The system is made up of a set Π of n asyn-
chronous sequential processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}; i is called the “in-
dex” of pi. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own
speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other pro-
cesses. “Sequential” means that a process executes one step at a time. This
does not prevent it from executing several threads with an appropriate mul-
tiplexing. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y are used to say that pi belongs
to the set Y .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging
messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asyn-
chronous” means that there is no bound on message transfer delays, but
these delays are finite. “Reliable” means that the network does not lose, du-
plicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that any pair
of processes is connected by a bidirectional channel. Hence, when a process
receives a message, it can identify its sender. A process pi sends a message
to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send tag(m) to pj”, where tag
is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presenta-
tion, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process
pi receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. The macro-
operation broadcast tag(m) is used as a shortcut for “for each pi ∈ Π do
send tag(m) to pj end for”.
Failure model. Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [42].
A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail
to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary
state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine pro-
cesses can collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending messages
with the same content, while they should send messages with distinct con-
tent if they were non-faulty). A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior
is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Let us notice that, as each pair of
processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate
another process. Byzantine processes can control the network by modifying
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the order in which messages are received, but they cannot postpone forever
message receptions.
Additional synchrony assumption. It it well-known that there is no
consensus algorithm ensuring both safety and liveness properties in fully
asynchronous message-passing systems in which even a single process may
crash [24]. As the crash failure model is less severe than the Byzantine
failure model, the consensus impossibility remains true if processes may
commit Byzantine failures. To circumvent such an impossibility, and ensure
the consensus termination property, we enrich the model with additional
synchrony assumptions. It is assumed that after some finite time τ , there
is an upper bound δ on message transfer and process computation delays.
This eventual (or partial) synchrony assumption is denoted 3Synch.
Notations. The acronym BAMPn,t[∅] is used to denote the previous basic
Byzantine Asynchronous Message-Passing computation model; ∅means that
there is no additional assumption. The basic computation model strength-
ened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
The latter computation model strengthened with the eventual synchrony
constraint 3Synch is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch].
3 Binary Byzantine Consensus
In this section we propose a solution to the binary consensus using a weak
coordinator that requires neither signatures, nor randomization. For the
sake of simplicity, we build the algorithm incrementally by first recalling
the binary consensus problem, then presenting a safe binary consensus al-
gorithm in the BAMPn,t[t < n/3] model and finally presenting a safe and
live consensus algorithm in the BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch] model.
Let V be the set of values that can be proposed by a process to the
consensus. While V can contain any number (≥ 2) of values in multivalued
consensus, it contains only two values in binary consensus, e.g., V = {0, 1}.
Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, the binary Byzan-
tine consensus (BBC) problem is for each of them to decide on a value in
such a way that the following properties are satisfied:
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a
value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other
value can be decided.
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3.1 The Binary Value Broadcast Communication Abstrac-
tion
Our binary consensus algorithm relies on a binary value all-to-all commu-
nication abstraction, denoted BV-broadcast, originally introduced for ran-
domized consensus [38], and restated in the appendix.
In a BV-broadcast instance, each non-faulty process pi broadcasts a bi-
nary value and obtains (BV-delivers) a set of binary values, stored in a
local read-only set variable denoted bin values i. This set, initialized to ∅,
increases when new values are received. BV-broadcast is defined by the four
following properties:
• BV-Obligation. If at least (t + 1) non-faulty processes BV-broadcast
the same value v, v is eventually added to the set bin values i of each
non-faulty process pi.
• BV-Justification. If pi is non-faulty and v ∈ bin values i, v has been
BV-broadcast by a non-faulty process.
• BV-Uniformity. If a value v is added to the set bin values i of a non-
faulty process pi, eventually v ∈ bin valuesj at every non-faulty pro-
cess pj .
• BV-Termination. Eventually the set bin values i of each non-faulty
process pi is not empty.
The following property is an immediate consequence of the previous
properties. Eventually the sets bin valuesi of the non-faulty processes pi
(i) become non-empty, (ii) become equal, (iii) contain all the values broad-
cast by non-faulty processes, and (iv) never contain a value broadcast only
by Byzantine processes. However, no non-faulty process knows when (ii)
and (iii) occur.
3.2 Local variables and message types
Each process pi manages the following local variables.
• esti: local current estimate of the decided value. It is initialized to the
value proposed by pi.
• ri: local asynchronous round number, initialized to 0.
• bin values i[1..]: array of binary values; bin values i[r] (initialized to ∅)
stores the local output set filled by BV-broadcast associated with round
r. (This unbounded array can be replaced by a single local variable
bin values i, reset to ∅ at the beginning of every round. We consider here
an array to simplify the presentation.)
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• bi: auxiliary binary value.
• values i: auxiliary set of values.
The algorithm uses two message types, denoted est and aux. Both are
used in each round, hence they always appear with a round number.
• est[r]() is used at round r by pi to BV-broadcast its current decision
estimate esti.
• aux[r]() is used by pi to disseminate its current value of bin values i[r]
(with the help of the broadcast() macro-operation).
3.3 A safe asynchronous binary Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm
For the sake of simplicity, we first introduce a new leaderless algorithm
ensuring BBC-Validity and BBC-Agreement properties in the system model
BAMPn,t[t < n/3] but not BBC-termination. The algorithm is depicted in
Figure 1 and provides the process pi with the operation bin propose(vi) to
propose its initial value vi. Process pi proceeds in asynchronous rounds and
decides value v when invoking decide(v) at line 10.
operation bin propose(vi) is
(01) esti ← vi; ri ← 0;
(02) while (true) do
(03) ri ← ri + 1;
(04) BV broadcast est[ri](esti); // add to bin values[ri] upon BV delivery
(05) wait until
(
bin valuesi[ri] 6= ∅
)
;
(06) broadcast aux[ri](bin valuesi[ri]);
(07) wait until
(
messages aux[ri](b valp(1)), ..., aux[ri](b valp(n−t)) have been received
from (n− t) different processes p(x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n− t, and their contents are
such that ∃ a non-empty set valuesi where (i) valuesi = ∪1≤x≤n−tb valp(x)
and (ii) valuesi ⊆ bin valuesi[ri]
)
;
(08) bi ← ri mod 2;
(09) if (valuesi = {v}) // valuesi is a singleton whose element is v
(10) then esti ← v; if (v = bi) then decide(v) if not yet done end if;
(11) else esti ← bi
(12) end if;
(13) end while.
(14) when b-val[r](v) is BV-delivered by BV broadcast[r] do
bin valuesi[r]← bin valuesi[r] ∪ {v};
Figure 1: A safe algorithm for the binary Byzantine consensus in
BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
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After it has deposited its binary proposal in esti (line 01), each
non-faulty process pi enters a sequence of asynchronous rounds. During a
round r, each non-faulty process pi proceeds in three phases.
Phase 1: Binary value broadcast to filter out the values of Byzan-
tine processes. Process pi first progresses to the next round, and binary
value broadcasts (BV-broadcast) its current estimate (line 04).
At each process pi, within the BV broadcast() algorithm, after receiving
the same value from t + 1 processes, process pi then rebroadcasts this
value. Each process pi BV-delivers a value v by adding it to its bin values i
set only if it receives v from 2t + 1 distinct processes. Eventually the
sets bin values of all non-faulty processes become non-empty, equal, and
contain exclusively all values broadcast by non-faulty processes [19]. When
a value is BV-delivered it is then added to bin values i[r] (line 14). Then
pi waits until its set bin values i[r] is not empty (let us recall that, when
bin values i[r] becomes non-empty, it has not necessarily its final value).
Phase 2: Exchanging estimates to converge to an agreement. This
second phase runs between line 06 and line 07). In this phase, pi broad-
casts normally a message aux[r]() whose content is bin values i[r] (line 06).
Then, pi waits until it has received a set of values values i satisfying the two
following properties.
• The values in values i come from the messages aux[r]() of at least (n− t)
different processes.
• values i ⊆ bin values i[r]. Thanks to the BV-broadcast that filters out
Byzantine value, even if Byzantine processes send fake messages aux[r]()
containing values proposed only by Byzantine processes, values i will con-
tain only values broadcast by non-faulty processes.
Hence, at any round r, after line 07, values i ⊆ {0, 1} and contains only
values BV-broadcast at line 04 by non-faulty processes.
Phase 3: Deciding upon estimate convergence to round number
modulo 2. The third phase runs between line 08 and line 12. This phase
is a purely local computation phase, during which (if not yet done) pi tries
to decide the value b = r mod 2 (lines 08 and 10), depending on the content
of values i.
• If values i contains a single element v (line 09), then v becomes pi’s new
estimate. Moreover, v is a candidate for the consensus decision. To ensure
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BBC-Agreement, v can be decided only if v = b. The decision is realized
by the statement decide(v) (line 10).
• If values i = {0, 1}, then pi cannot decide. As both values have been
proposed by non-faulty processes, to entail convergence to agreement, pi
selects one of them (b, which is the same at all non-faulty processes for
the same round) as its new estimate (line 11).
Let us observe that the invocation of decide(v) by pi does not terminate the
participation of pi in the algorithm, namely pi continues looping forever.
This is because a deciding process may need to help other processes con-
verging to the decision in the two subsequent rounds. This algorithm can be
modified to avoid this infinite loop, but to preserve the simplicity in the pre-
sentation, we postpone a deterministic terminating solution to Section 3.4.
The proof of correctness of algorithm 1 is deferred to the appendix.
3.4 Psync: Safe and Live Consensus in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3,3Synch]
We now present Psync, an algorithm solving the binary Byzantine consensus
problem in the BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch] model. Similar to the safe
algorithm (Section 3.3), Psync does not use signatures or randomization
and has the following additional characteristics:
• Psync is time optimal [23] in that it terminates in O(t) message delays.
• When all non-faulty processes propose the same value, Psync termi-
nates in O(1) message delays, even under asynchrony.
• Psync does not wait for a message from its coordinator and does not
need recovery.
The Psync algorithm is presented in Figure 2 as an extension of the safe
algorithm in Figure 1, with new and modified lines prefixed with “New” and
“M-”, respectively. Lines prefixed by “Opt” are optional optimizations. In
addition to the use of local timers, to eventually benefit from the 3Synch
assumption, the algorithm uses a weak coordinator: the weak coordinator of
round r is the process pi such that i = ((r− 1) mod n) + 1. Note that this
new round coordinator is only used to help agreement by suggesting a value
and thus differs from the classic coordinator [17,22].
Additional local variables and message type. In addition to esti,
ri, bin values i[r], and values i, each process pi manages the following local
variables.
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operation bin propose(vi) is
(01) esti ← vi; ri ← 0;
timeouti ← 0;
(02) while (true) do
(03) ri ← ri + 1;
(Opt1) if (esti = −1) then esti ← 1; // “fast-path” for round 1, only used in the reduction in Sect. 4
(04) else BV broadcast est[ri](esti);
end if;
(New1) wait until
(
bin valuesi[ri] 6= ∅
)
;
timeouti ← timeouti + 1; set timeri to timeouti;
(New2) coord i ← ((ri − 1) mod n) + 1;
if (i = coord i) then
{w} = bin valuesi[ri]; // w is the first value to enter bin valuesi[ri]
broadcast coord value[ri](w)
end if;
(M-05) wait until
(
(bin valuesi[ri] 6= ∅) ∧ (timeri expired)
)
;
(New3) if
(
(coord value[ri](w) received from pcoordi) ∧ (w ∈ bin valuesi[ri])
)
then auxi ← {w}
else auxi ← bin valuesi[ri]
end if;
(M-06) broadcast aux[ri](auxi);
(New4) wait until
(
a message aux[ri]() has been received from (n− t) different processes
)
;
set timeri to timeouti;
(M-07) wait until
(
(messages aux[ri](b valp(1)), ..., aux[ri](b valp(n−t)) have been received
from (n− t) different processes p(x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n− t, and their contents are
such that ∃ a non-empty set valuesi where (i) valuesi = ∪1≤x≤n−tb valp(x)
and (ii) valuesi ⊆ bin valuesi[ri]) ∧ (timeri expired)
)
;
(New5) if (when considering the whole set of the messages aux[ri]() received, several sets
values1i, values2i, ... satisfy the previous wait predicate) ∧ (one of them is auxi)
then valuesi ← auxi end if; // valuesi is either defined here or at line M07
(08) bi ← ri mod 2;
(09) if (valuesi = {v}) // valuesi is a singleton whose element is v
(10) then esti ← v; if (v = bi) then decide(v) if not yet done end if;
(11) else esti ← bi
(12) end if;
(Opt2) if (decided in round ri) then // the following are termination conditions
wait until (bin valuesi[ri] = {0, 1}) // only go to the next round when necessary
else if (decided in round ri − 2) then halt end if; // everyone has decided by now
end if;
(13) end while.
Figure 2: A safe and live algorithm for the binary Byzantine consensus in
BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch]; line (Opt1) is an optimization only applied in
the multivalued reduction presented in Section 4; line (Opt2) is a mechanism
to prevent unnecessary rounds from being executed
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• timeri is a local timer, and timeouti a timeout value, both used to exploit
the assumption 3Synch.
• coordi is the index of the current weak round coordinator.
• auxi is an auxiliary set of values, used to store the value (if any) that the
current weak coordinator strives to impose as decision value.
The weak coordinator of round r, uses the message type coord value[r]()
to broadcast the value it suggests for decision.
Description of the extended algorithm. We now list the new and
modified lines that were added in Figure 2.
• At line New1, pi waits until a value enters bin values, then sets its local
timer, whose expiry is used in the predicate of line M-05. The timeout
value is initialized before entering the loop, and then increased at every
round.
• Line Opt1 is an optimization only used along with the reduction to mul-
tivalued consensus presented in Section 4.
• Line New4 waits until (n−t) aux[r]() messages are received from different
processes before reseting the timer, whose expiry is used in the predicate
of the modified line M-07.
• Lines New2, New3, M-06, and New5 realize a mechanism that allows
the current weak coordinator (whose value is computed on line New2)
to try to impose the first value that enters into its bin values set as the
decided value. Combined with the fact that there is a time after which the
messages exchanged by the non-faulty processes are timely, this ensures
that there will be a round during which the non-faulty processes will have
a single value in their sets values i, which entails their decision.
• Modified lines M-05 and M-07: addition of the timer expiration in the
predicate considered at the corresponding line.
• Line Opt2 is an optional optimization to minimize the amount of extra
rounds processes need to execute after deciding. The first condition (wait
until (bin values i[ri] = {0, 1})) ensures that, after decision, a process
only continues to the next round if some other non-faulty process did not
decide in the current round. As this can only happen if both 0 and 1
enter bin values, the process will not move on to the next round until
this is true. The second condition, (if (decided in round ri − 2)), halts
the process 2 rounds after it has decided, as all non-faulty processes are
guaranteed to have decided by this round.
The aforementioned modifications exploit the weak coordinator that only
helps resolving disagreement by broadcasting a value that all non-faulty
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adopt, as opposed to leaders or classic (strong) coordinators [17,22]. To this
end:
• The weak coordinator pk broadcasts the message coord value[ri](w),
where w is the first value that enters its bin values set (line New2). If
pk is non-faulty, the timeout values of the non-faulty processes are big
enough, and there is a bound on message transfer delays, so that all non-
faulty processes will receive it before their timer expiration at line M-05.
• Then, assuming the previous item, all non-faulty processes set auxi to
{w} (line New3), and broadcast it (line M-06). The predicate w ∈
bin values i[ri] is used to prevent a Byzantine coordinator to send fake
values that would foil non-faulty processes.
• Finally, all the non-faulty processes will receive the message aux[ri]({w})
from (n− t) different processes, and, by line New5, will set values i = {w}.
This entails their decision during the round (r + 1) or (r + 2).
To ensure that slow processes catch up to faster processes that have reached
later rounds, once a process has received at least t + 1 messages belonging
to a round r, the process does wait for timeouts in rounds less than r. In
the presence of 3Synch, this ensures that all non-faulty processes eventually
execute synchronous rounds. The proof of liveness of algorithm 2 is deferred
to the appendix.
4 DBFT: From Binary Byzantine Consensus to
Blockchain Consensus
This section presents a Democratic Binary Fault Tolerant algorithm, called
DBFT. It relies on a reduction from the binary Byzantine consensus Psync
to the multivalue consensus and is also time optimal, resilience optimal and
does not use classic (strong) coordinator, which means that it does not wait
for a particular message. In addition, it finishes in only 4 messages delays
in the good case, when all non-faulty processes propose the same value.
We consider a variant of the classical Byzantine consensus problem,
called the Validity Predicate-based Byzantine Consensus (denoted VPBC).
Its validity requirement relies on an application-specific valid() predicate
that is used by blockchains to indicate whether a value is valid. Assuming
that each non-faulty process proposes a valid value, each of them has to
decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are satisfied.
• VPBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a
value.
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• VPBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• VPBC-Validity. A decided value is valid, i.e., it satisfies the predefined
predicate denoted valid(), and if all non-faulty processes propose the same
value v then they decide v.
This definition generalizes the classical definition of Byzantine consensus,
which does not include the predicate valid(). This predicate is introduced to
take into account the distinctive characteristics of consortium blockchains,
and possibly other specific Byzantine consensus problems. In the context
of consortium blockchains, a proposal is not valid if it does not contain an
appropriate hash of the last block added to the Blockchain or contains invalid
transactions. There exist similar problem definitions whose validity also
relies on the notion of a predicate. The validated Byzantine consensus [13]
differs in that the same valid value proposed by non-faulty processes has
to be decided if all processes are non-faulty. The asynchronous Byzantine
agreement [29] defines a legal value similar to our valid value, however, its
validity does not require a legal value to be decided if multiple ones exist,
while we require that any decided value must be valid. A probabilistic
variant [14] required that the decided value be one of the proposed values,
something we do not require.
operation mv propose(vi) is
(01) RB broadcast val(vi);
(02) repeat if
(∃ k : (proposalsi[k] 6= ⊥)∧
(BIN CONS [k].bin propose() not invoked)
)
(03) then invoke BIN CONS [k].bin propose(−1) end if;
(04) until (∃` : bin decisionsi[`] = 1) end repeat;
(05) for each k s.t. BIN CONS [k].bin propose() not yet invoked
(06) do invoke BIN CONS [k].bin propose(0) end for;
(07) wait until (
∧
1≤x≤n bin decisionsi[x] 6= ⊥);
(08) j ← min{x such that bin decisionsi[x] = 1};
(09) wait until (proposalsi[j] 6= ⊥);
(10) decide(proposalsi[j]).
(11) when val(v) is RB-delivered from pj do
if valid(v) then
proposalsi[j]← v;
BV-deliver b-val[1](1) to BIN CONS [j] end if.
(12) when BIN CONS [k].bin propose() decides a value b
do bin decisionsi[k]← b.
Figure 3: From multivalued to binary Byzantine consensus in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3,BBC]
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Binary consensus objects. The processes cooperate with an array
of binary Byzantine consensus objects denoted BIN CONS [1..n]. The
instance BIN CONS [k] allows the non-faulty processes to find an agreement
on the value proposed by pk. This object is implemented with the binary
Byzantine consensus algorithm presented in Section 3.4. To simplify the
presentation, we consider that a process pi launches its participation in
BIN CONS [k] by invoking BIN CONS [k].bin propose(v), where v ∈ {0, 1}.
Then, it executes the corresponding code in a specific thread, which
eventually returns the value decided by BIN CONS [k].
Local variables. Each process pi manages the following local variables; ⊥
denotes a default value that cannot be proposed by a (faulty or non-faulty)
process.
• An array proposals i[1..n] initialized to [⊥, · · · ,⊥]. The aim of proposals i[j]
is to contain the value proposed by pj .
• An array bin decisions i[1..n] initialized to [⊥, · · · ,⊥]. The aim of
bin decisions i[k] is to contain the value (0 or 1) decided by the binary
consensus object BIN CONS [k].
The algorithm. The algorithm reducing from the binary Byzantine con-
sensus to multivalue Byzantine consensus is described in Figure 3 and is
similar to an existing reduction [7], except that it combines the reliable
broadcast, RB-broadcast [10], restated in the appendix, with our binary
consensus messages to finish in 4 message delays in the good case. Initially,
a process invokes the operation mv propose(v), where v is the value it pro-
poses to the multivalued consensus. Process pi executes four phases.
Phase 1: pi disseminates its value (lines 01 and 11). Process pi first sends its
value to all the processes by invoking the RB-broadcast operation (line 01).
If a process RB-delivers a valid value v RB-broadcast by a process pj , then
the process stores it in proposalsi[j] and BV-delivers 1 directly to round
one of instance BIN CONS [j] (line 11), placing 1 in its bin values i for that
instance.
Phase 2: Process pi starts participating in a first set of binary consensus
instances (lines 02-04). It enters a loop in which it starts participating in the
binary consensus instances. Process pi invokes a binary consensus instance
k with value −1 for each value RB-broadcast by process pk that pi RB-
delivered. −1 is a special value that allows the binary consensus to skip the
BV broadcast step (line (Opt1)) and immediately send an aux message with
value 1, allowing the binary consensus to terminate with value 1 in a single
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message delay. (Note that the timeout of the first round is set to 0 so the
binary consensus proceeds as fast as possible.) The direct delivery of 1 into
bin values is possible due to an overlap in the properties of BV broadcast
and RB-broadcast, allowing us to skip a message step of our binary consen-
sus algorithm. In other words, all non-faulty processes will RB-deliver the
proposed value, and as a result will also BV-deliver 1. This loop stops as
soon as pi discovers a binary consensus instance BIN CONS [`] in which 1
was decided (line 04). (As all non-faulty processes will only have 1 in their
bin values until an instance terminates, the first instance to decide 1 will
terminate in one message delay following the RB-delivery.)
Phase 3: pi starts participating in all other binary consensus instances
(lines 05-06). After it knows a binary consensus instance decided 1, pi in-
vokes with bin propose(0) all the binary consensus instances BIN CONS [k]
in which it has not yet participated. Let us notice that it is possible that, for
some of these instances BIN CONS [k], no process has RB-delivered a value
from the associated process pk. The aim of these consensus participation is
to ensure that all binary consensus instances eventually terminate.
Phase 4: pi decides a value (lines 07-10 and 12). Process pi considers the
first (according to the process index order) among the successful binary con-
sensus objects, i.e., the ones that returned 1 (line 08). Let BIN CONS [j]
be this binary consensus object. As the associated decided value is 1, at
least one non-faulty process proposed 1, which means that it RB-delivered
a value from the process pj (lines 02-03). Observe that this value is eventu-
ally RB-delivered by every non-faulty process. Consequently, pi decides it
(lines 09-10). Notice that as soon as the binary consensus instance with the
smallest process index terminates with 1, the reduction can return as soon
as the associated value is RB-delivered. This is due to the observation that
the values associated with the larger indices will not be used.
Complexity. This eager termination allows the consensus algorithm to
terminate in 4 message delays in the good scenario, i.e., 3 message delays
to execute the reliable broadcast and 1 to complete the binary consensus
by skipping the BV broadcast step. In this case the reliable broadcast and
binary consensus each have O(n2) message complexity for a total of O(n3)
including all n instances. In the case of faulty processes or asynchrony the
algorithm will need at least 3 additional message delays for binary consensus
instances to terminate with 0.
Theorem 1. The algorithm described in Figure 3 implements the multi-
valued Byzantine consensus (VPBC) in the system model BAMPn,t[t <
16
n/3,BBC].
The proof of correctness of DBFT is deferred to the appendix.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, our weak coordinator based Byzantine consensus is time op-
timal, resilience optimal, does not rely on randomization or signatures and
improves over the randomized Byzantine consensus algorithms [37, 38] by
terminating faster in various geo-distributed experiments. We presented
how it can be used for consortium blockchains by generalizing the Byzan-
tine consensus problem and presenting a solution that combines an existing
reduction with our binary Byzantine consensus algorithm.
DBFT is now at the heart of the Red Belly Blockchain, a fast per-
missioned blockchain. Future work involves extending this permissioned
blockchain into a public blockchain using DBFT for reconfiguration to pe-
riodically change at runtime the subset of machines running the consensus,
similar to Solida [1] but without proof-of-work.
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A Experiments on 100 VMs on Distinct Conti-
nents
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our consensus algorithm
against a randomized consensus applied to blockchains on 100 Amazon ma-
chines located in 5 distinct data centers across different continents.
A.1 Experimental setup
To measure the performance of our consensus algorithm in a real network
setting, we deployed our binary consensus algorithm called “Psync” on 100
machines distributed across different continents.
To implement point-to-point reliable channels over the Internet, we im-
plemented secure channels using TLS on top of TCP/IP. Note that TLS uses
a public key cryptosystem (and signatures) only to exchange secret keys, but
no signatures are used by our consensus algorithm. Note that the Red Belly
Blockchain builds upon the same combination of DBFT and TLS by storing
the necessary certificates in its blocks [25].
For the sake of comparison, we also implemented the randomized binary
Byzantine consensus algorithm from Moste´faoui et al. [37], called “Coin”,
as a baseline. Coin terminates in O(1) rounds in expectation and is at
the heart of the HoneyBadger permissioned blockchain [36] but requires a
fair scheduler [38]. Our implementation reuses the common coin implemen-
tation of HoneyBadger [36] that consists of a one step message exchange
and threshold signatures. All 100 machines are c4.xlarge of Amazon EC2
equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 with 4 vCPUs, 7.5 GiB RAM, and
“moderate” network performance.
We set the timeouts of Psync to be null in the first t rounds before incre-
menting exponentially. We implemented reliability using sequence numbers
and negative acknowledgments at the application level. All consensus de-
cisions are stored to disk in an append only log. Results are taken as the
average of 100 instances of consensus.
A.2 Geo-distributed experiments between 5 datacenters
Figure 4 compares the average latency and number of rounds needed to
terminate Psync and Coin in 5 Amazon datacenters, 3 in the US (Oregon,
Northern California, and Ohio) and 2 in Europe (Ireland and Frankfurt).
Our ping latency across continents is between 91 ms and 164 ms and within
one continent between 22 ms and 71 ms. In Figure 4(left) the x-axis denotes
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Figure 4: Geo-distributed experiments of latency and average number of
rounds for our deterministic binary Byzantine consensus “Psync” and the
randomized binary Byzantine consensus “Coin” with 4 different Byzantine
attacks (Byz1, ..., Byz4): (left) with varying levels of initial disagreement,
(right) with random initial proposals.
the approximate percentage of processes that have an initial proposal of 0
(others proposing 1). Psync terminates in at most three rounds on average.
Given that Psync is designed to terminate with 1 in the first round and
0 in the second round, the best performance is reached when the majority of
proposals are 1. In all cases the latency of Psync is lower than Coin due to
the coin needing an extra message step, additional computation complexity,
and randomness.
A.3 Tolerance to various Byzantine attacks
Figure 4(right) compares the algorithms with the following Byzantine be-
haviors: (Byz1) Byzantine processes flip the binary values of their messages;
(Byz2) Byzantine processes are mute; (Byz3) extends Byz1 with Byzantine
coordinators that send random binary values in their coord value mes-
sages; (Byz4) Byzantine processes form a coalition to limit the progress
within rounds by sending their own messages without waiting so they can
be processed before others. Both Byz3 and Byz4 are specific to Psync.
More precisely, Byz4 mimics a behavior where the coordinator is faulty
to limit progress during rounds by trying to have (i) no non-faulty processes
to decide in round r and (ii) have two non-faulty processes starting round
r + 1 with distinct estimates. To this end, the faulty nodes start the round
by broadcasting both 1 and 0 in their BV-broadcast. Then, the Byzantine
coordinator sends a message coord value with ¬(r mod 2) to all non-faulty
nodes. Finally, Byzantine nodes instantly send aux message with value
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¬(r mod 2) to a single node and send aux message with value (r mod 2) to
the remaining nodes. Faulty nodes in Byz4 have the power to send their
messages instantly and to observe the messages received at non-faulty nodes,
giving them more power to delay termination. They do not control the speed
or order of messages from non-faulty nodes.
In Psync, the Byzantine processes are chosen as the first t coordinators.
Coin has the highest latency with the Byzantine behaviors, but its number
of rounds is least affected. Byzantine behavior Byz3 is the slowest to ter-
minate for Psync because it allows Byzantine processes to force the most
disagreement. While theoretically Byz4 could always prevent termination
in the first t rounds, the average number of rounds is only increased to 6
(but has a maximum of 35). This is due to the fact that they do not control
the speed of messages of non-faulty processes in the network preventing the
non-terminating case. Furthermore, given that the Byzantine processes have
to act fast to ensure their messages are processed first, the average latency
is lower than Byz1 and Byz2.
A.4 Detailed description of Byzantine behavior Byz4
In the presence of a faulty coordinator it is possible to execute repeated
rounds in which there is no termination, behavior Byz4 tries to capture this
behavior. Note that we allow Byzantine messages to be delivered instantly
by computing them directly at the non-faulty nodes when needed. We will
now describe the Byz4 behavior. Assume we are in a round r. There are two
main things we need to ensure: (i) no non-faulty process decides in round r
(ii) at least one non-faulty node must start round r+ 1 with an estimate of
0 and another start with the estimate of 1.
To ensure (i) we need (a) ¬(r mod 2) to enter bin values of non-faulty
nodes and (b) no node must receive n−t aux messages with value (r mod 2).
Then to ensure (ii) we need (c) both 0 and 1 to enter bin values of non-faulty
nodes, (d) at least one node must receive receive n − t aux messages with
value ¬(r mod 2), and (e) at least one node must receive receive an aux
messages with value (r mod 2).
Thus, Byzantine nodes start the round by broadcasting both 1 and 0
in their BV-broadcast to ensure (a) and (c). To try to ensure (b), the
Byzantine coordinator sends a message coord value with ¬(r mod 2) to all
non-faulty nodes, this message is delivered instantly, as a result all non-faulty
processes broadcast an aux message with value ¬(r mod 2). Then to ensure
(d), Byzantine nodes instantly send aux message with value ¬(r mod 2) to a
single node. Furthermore, to ensure (e), Byzantine nodes instantly send aux
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message with value (r mod 2) to the remaining nodes. Assuming both 0 and
1 entered bin values at appropriate times at non-faulty nodes, termination
will be prevented for this round.
The difficulty in ensuring this non-termination scenario is that the
Byzantine nodes do not control the time that both 1 and 0 enter bin values
of non-faulty nodes. If ¬(r mod 2) enters too late, a process may broad-
cast (r mod 2) as its aux message, and as a result we may fail with (d).
Otherwise if (r mod 2) enters bin values too late, all non-faulty processes
may terminate with n − t aux messages with value ¬(r mod 2). Similar
timing arguments can be made for other non-terminating scenarios that use
different message patterns.
A.5 Different experiment configurations
Figure 5 uses the same experimental settings as Figure 4, except is run with
100 nodes within a single datacenter. Here we see a much larger gap in
latency between Psync and Coin as the computation of the cryptographic
operations of the random coin is much larger than the network latency. Note
that the latency of both algorithms could be decreased through the use of
message authentication codes (MACs) with datagram broadcasts, but we
expect the latency to still be dominated by the crypotgraphic operations of
the coin.
Figure 5 uses the same experimental settings as Figure 4, except is run
with 1 node in each of Amazon’s 14 EC2 data centers. The results are
similar to the 5 datacenter case of Figure 4, but with higher latency in most
cases due to the increased geo-distribution.
B Proofs of safety and liveness of the algorithms
B.1 Safety proof of the binary Byzantine consensus (Fig-
ure 1)
The proof is described from a point of view of a non-faulty process pi. Let
valuesri denote the value of the set values i which satisfies the predicate of
line 07 during a round r. Moreover, let us recall that, given a run, C denotes
the set of non-faulty processes in this run.
Lemma 1. Let t < n/3. If at the beginning of a round r, all non-faulty
processes have the same estimate v, they never change their estimate value
thereafter.
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Figure 5: Single datacenter comparison of latency and average number of
rounds to terminate of our deterministic binary Byzantine consensus against
randomized binary Byzantine consensus: (Left)
Proof Let us assume that all non-faulty processes (which are at least n−t >
t + 1) have the same estimate v when they start round r. Hence, they all
BV-broadcast the same message est[r](v) at line 04. It follows from the BV-
Justification and BV-Obligation properties that each non-faulty process pi
is such that bin values i[r] = {v} at line 05, and consequently can broadcast
only aux[r]({v}) at line 06. Considering any non-faulty process pi, it then
follows from the predicate of line 07 (values i contains only v), the predicate
of line 09 (values i is a singleton), and the assignment of line 10, that esti
keeps the value v. 2Lemma 1
Lemma 2. Let t < n/3.
(
(pi, pj ∈ C) ∧ (valuesri = {v}) ∧ (valuesrj =
{w}))⇒ (v = w).
Proof Let pi be a non-faulty process such that values
r
i = {v}. It follows
from line 07 that pi received the same message aux[r]({v}) from (n − t)
different processes, i.e., from at least (n− 2t) different non-faulty processes.
As n− 2t ≥ t+ 1, this means that pi received the message aux[r]({v}) from
a set Qi including at least (t+ 1) different non-faulty processes.
Let pj be a non-faulty process such that values
r
j = {w}. Hence, pj
received aux[r]({w}) from a set Qj of at least (n− t) different processes. As
(n−t)+(t+1) > n, it follows that Qi∩Qj 6= ∅. Let pk ∈ Qi∩Qj . As pk ∈ Qi,
it is a non-faulty process. Hence, at line 06, pk sent the same message
aux[r]({}) to pi and pj , and we consequently have v = w. 2Lemma 2
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Lemma 3. Let t < n/3. The value decided by a non-faulty process was
proposed by a non-faulty process.
Proof Let us consider the round r = 1. Due to the BV-Justification
property of the BV-broadcast of line 04, it follows that the sets bin values i[1]
contains only values proposed by non-faulty processes. Consequently, the
non-faulty processes broadcast at line 06 messages aux[1]() containing sets
with values proposed only by non-faulty processes. It then follows from the
predicate (i) of line 07 (values1i ⊆ bin values i[1]), and the BV-Justification
property of the BV-broadcast abstraction, that the set values1i of each non-
faulty process contains only values proposed by non-faulty processes. Hence,
the assignment of esti (be it at line 10 or 11) provides it with a value
proposed by a non-faulty process. The same reasoning applies to rounds
r = 2, r = 3, etc., which concludes the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 3
Lemma 4. Let t < n/3. No two non-faulty processes decide different values.
Proof Let r be the first round during which a non-faulty process decides,
let pi be a non-faulty process that decides in round r (line 10), and let v be
the value it decides. Hence, we have valuesri = {v} where v = (r mod 2).
If another non-faulty process pj decides during round r, we have
valuesrj = {w}, and, due to Lemma 2, we have w = v. Hence, all non-
faulty processes that decide in round r, decide v. Moreover, each non-faulty
process that decides in round r has previously assigned v = (r mod 2) to its
local estimate esti.
Let pj be a non-faulty that does not decide in round r. As values
r
i = {v},
and pj does not decide in round r, it follows from Lemma 2 that we cannot
have valuesrj = {1− v}, and consequently valuesrj = {0, 1}. Hence, in round
r, pj executes line 11, where it assigns the value (r mod 2) = v to its local
estimate estj .
It follows that all non-faulty processes start round (r+ 1) with the same
local estimate v = r mod 2. Due to Lemma 1, they keep this estimate value
forever. Hence, no different value can be decided in a future round by a
non-faulty process that has not decided during round r, which concludes
the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 4
Lemma 5. Let the system model be BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. No non-faulty
process remains blocked forever in a round.
Proof Let us assume by contradiction that there is a first round in which
some non-faulty process pi remains blocked forever. As all non-faulty pro-
cesses terminate round (r − 1), they all start round r and all invoke the
26
round r instance of BV-broadcast. Due to the BV-Termination property,
the wait until() statement of line 05 terminates at each non-faulty process.
Then, as all non-faulty processes broadcast a message aux[r]() (line 06),
it follows that the wait until() statement of line 07 terminates at each non-
faulty process. It follows that there is no first round at which a non-faulty
process remains blocked forever during round r. 2Lemma 5
Lemma 6. Let the system model be BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. If all non-faulty
processes pi terminate a round r with values
r
i = {v}, they all decide by round
(r + 1).
Proof If all non-faulty processes are such that valuesri = {v}, and the
round r is such that v = (r mod 2), it follows from lines 08-10 that (if not
yet done) each non-faulty process decides during round r.
If r is such that v 6= (r mod 2), each non-faulty process sets its current
estimate to v (line 10). As during the next round we have v = ((r +
1) mod 2), and valuesr+1i = bin values i[r + 1] = {v} at each non-faulty
process pi, each non-faulty process decides during round (r+ 1). 2Lemma 6
Lemma 7. Let the system model be BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. If every non-
faulty process pi terminates a round r with values
r
i = {0, 1}, then it decides
by round (r + 2).
Proof If every non-faulty processes pi is such that values
r
i = {0, 1}, it
executes line 11 during round r, and we have esti = (r mod 2) = v when
it starts round (r + 1). Due to Lemma 1, it keeps this estimate forever. As
all non-faulty processes execute rounds (r + 1) and (r + 2) (Lemma 5) and
v = ((r + 2) mod 2), we have valuesr+2i = {v}, at each non-faulty process
pi. It follows that each non-faulty process decides at line 10. 2Lemma 7
Theorem 2. The algorithm described in Figure 1 satisfies the safety con-
sensus properties.
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 3 (BBC-Validity) and Lemma 4
(BBC-Agreement). 2Theorem 2
Decision The algorithm described in Figure 1 does not guarantee decision.
This may occur for example when some non-faulty processes propose 0,
the other non-faulty processes propose 1, and the Byzantine processes play
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double game, each proposing 0 or 1 to each non-faulty process, so that
it never happens that at the end of a round all non-faulty processes have
either values i = {0, 1}, or they all have values i = {v} with v either 0 or
1. In other words, if not all non-faulty processes propose the same initial
value, Byzantine processes can make, round after round, some non-faulty
processes have values i = {0, 1}, while the rest of non-faulty processes have
values i = {v}, with v 6= (r mod 2), avoiding them to decide.1
B.2 Why the safe algorithm does not terminate with 3Synch
To circumvent the consensus impossibility [24] and find a terminating so-
lution, one could be tempted to consider the BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch]
model and setting a timer, that increases in each round, by replacing line 05
in Figure 1 with a new line called “New1” and a modified line 05 called
“M-05”: ...
(New1) timeouti ← timeouti + 1; set timeri to timeouti;
(M-05) wait until
(
(bin valuesi[ri] 6= ∅) ∧ (timeri expired)
)
;
...
In fact, this could seem sufficient to eventually give enough time for messages
to be delivered. As we explain below, it would still be possible for a Byzan-
tine process to wait depending on the timer of the current round to send
a message BVAL(v) to a non-faulty process early enough so that this non-
faulty process receives the message before its local timer expires but too
late for this non-faulty process to rebroadcast it and for other non-faulty
processes to deliver it before their timers expire.
As an example, consider a counter-example of n = 4 processes among
which t = 1 process is Byzantine that starts from a round r such that r
mod 2 = 1 with non-faulty processes with estimates 0, 0 and 1. There is an
execution leading to a round r+ 1 where (r+ 1) mod 2 = 0 and non-faulty
processes have estimates 0, 1 and 1. The symmetric of this counter-example
can then be used from round r+1 where non-faulty processes have estimates
0, 1 and 1 to round r+2 where non-faulty processes have estimates 0, 0 and
1. An infinite sequence alternating this counter-example and its symmetric
example illustrates an infinite execution where no non-faulty process decides.
The counter-example is represented as a distributed execution in Fig-
ure 6, where p1, p2 and p3 are non-faulty processes while p4 is a Byzantine
process, as a distributed execution where time increases from left to right,
1In the case of the randomized binary consensus algorithm of [38], the common coin
guarantees termination with probability 1, because eventually the singleton value in
valuesi will match the coin.
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Figure 6: An execution of n = 4 processes exchanging broadcast messages
(represented by triangles between n− t = 3 non-faulty processes) in round r
(r mod 2 = 1) where est1 = est2 = 0 and est3 = 1 leading to a round r+ 1
where est1 = 0 and est2 = est3 = 1
where arrows represent messages sent by the Byzantine process p4 and trian-
gles represent the broadcast messages among non-faulty processes: the left
angle of each triangle indicates the source of the broadcast while the right
edge indicates the processes where messages are delivered. (The receipt of
messages by the Byzantine process p4 are omitted for the sake of clarity in
the presentation.)
The first four triangles represent the BV-broadcast (Figure 7) where
p1 and p2 broadcasts BVAL(0) while p3 broadcasts BVAL(1) according to
their initial estimates. Once p3 delivers BVAL(0) from t+ 1 = 2 non-faulty
processes, it broadcasts the value 0 that it never broadcast before as specified
in the code of Figure 7.
During BV-broadcast, all non-faulty processes receive from 2t + 1 = 3
non-faulty processes. Now consider that the Byzantine process p4 sends
BVAL(1) to p2 which makes p2 rebroadcast it as part of the BV-broadcast
because it has now received message BVAL(1) from 2 = t + 1 distinct pro-
cesses, namely p3 and p4. We can thus obtain that bin values1 = {0},
bin values2 = {0, 1} and bin values3 = {0} at the time non-faulty processes
broadcast their AUX messages. By sending AUX({0}) to p1, the Byzantine
process p4 allows p1 to choose values1 = {0} that has received AUX({0})
from n − t = 3 distinct processes (p1, p3 and p4). while the others have to
choose values2 = values3 = {0, 1} as they receive AUX({0}), AUX({0, 1}),
AUX({0}) from p1, p2 and p3, respectively. As b = r mod 2 = 1, it results
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from line 11 that p1, p2 and p3 have estimates 0, 1, 1, respectively when
starting the round r + 1.
Applying the symmetric example would lead to round r + 2 with the
same estimates 0, 0, 1 as in round r, indicating the existence of an infinite
execution.
B.3 Proof of Safety and Liveness of the 3Synch-based Binary
Byzantine Consensus (Figure 2)
The proof consists of two parts: (i) show that the added statements preserve
the consensus safety properties proved for the algorithm of Figure 1, and
(ii) show that all non-faulty processes eventually decide.
Lemma 8. The algorithm described in Figure 2 satisfies the BBC-Validity
and BBC-Agreement properties.
Proof The proof consists in showing that the Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4 remain
correct when considering the algorithm of Figure 2. Basically, these proofs
remain correct because, as the new and modified statements do not assign
values to the sets bin values i[r] at the non-faulty processes, and no property
of bin values i is related to a timing assumption, the set bin values i[r] of
a non-faulty process pi can never contain values proposed by Byzantine
processes only. It follows from this observation that the local variables esti
and values i of any non-faulty process pi (defined or updated at lines M-07,
New5, 10, or 11) can contain only values from non-faulty processes. More
specifically we have the following.
• Lemma 1. Let r be the considered round, and v be the current estimate
of the non-faulty processes. We then have bin values i[r] = {v} at
line M-05 of every non-faulty process pi.
– If the weak round coordinator pk is non-faulty, we have at every
non-faulty process auxi = bin values i[r] = {v}. It then follows
that valuesri = {v} and the lemma remains true due to lines 09
and 10.
– If the weak round coordinator pk is Byzantine and sends possibly
different values to the non-faulty processes, let us consider a non-
faulty process that receives the message coord value[r]({1 −
v}). As (1 − v) /∈ bin values i[r], at line New3, pi executes
the “else” part where it sets auxi to {v} (the only value in
bin values i[r]), and the lemma follows.
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• Lemma 2. As it does not depend on the timers, and is related only
to the fact that each of the sets valuesri and values
r
j of two non-faulty
processes are singletons, the proof remains valid.
• Lemma 3. The proof follows from the fact that the sets bin values i of
any non-faulty process can contain only values proposed by non-faulty
processes.
• Lemma 4. As it relies only on the set valuesri of each non-faulty
process pi, this proof remains correct.
2Lemma 8
Lemma 9. The algorithm described in Figure 2 ensures that every non-
faulty process decides.
Proof Let us first observe that, as timers always expire, the “wait” state-
ments (modified lines M-05 and M-07) always terminate, and consequently
Lemma 5 remains true. The reader can also check that the proof of Lemma 6
remains valid.
It remains to show that there is eventually a round r at the end of
which all non-faulty processes pi have the same value w in their set variables
(valuesri = {w}) (from which decision follows due to Lemma 6) The proof
shows that, due to (a) the eventual synchrony assumption, (b) the weak
round coordinator mechanism, and (c) the messages coord value[ ]() sent
by the weak round coordinators, there is a round r such that valuesri = {w}
at each non-faulty process.
Let us consider a time τ from which (due to Lemma 11) the system be-
haves synchronously (the timeout values of all non-faulty processes are such
that all the messages exchanged by the non-faulty processes arrive timely).
Let r be the smallest round number coordinated by a non-faulty process
pk after τ . At line New2 of round r, pk broadcasts coord value[r](w),
being w the first value that enters its set bin valuesk[r]. The message co-
ord value[r](w) is received timely by all non-faulty processes, that set
auxi to {w} in line New3. Consequently, in line M-06 all non-faulty pro-
cesses broadcast aux[r]({w}), and receive in line M-07 (n− t) aux[r]({w})
messages from different processes, setting in line New5 values i to {w}. By
Lemma 6, all non-faulty processes decide w by round r+ 1, which concludes
the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 9
Theorem 3. The algorithm described in Figure 2 solves the binary Byzan-
tine consensus in the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch].
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Proof The proof follows directly from Lemma 8 (BBC-Validity and BBC-
Agreement) and Lemma 9 (BBC-Termination). 2Theorem 3
From asynchrony to synchrony In order to guarantee decision, after
the eventual synchrony assumption holds and the timeout value at each non-
faulty process is big enough (i.e., bigger than the upper bound on message
transmission delay), we need that eventually all non-faulty processes exe-
cute rounds synchronously (as assumed by Lemma 9). Observe that, due to
initial asynchrony, non-faulty processes can start the consensus algorithm at
different instants. Moreover, due to the potential participation of Byzantine
processes, some non-faulty processes can advance rounds, without deciding,
while other non-faulty processes are still executing previous rounds. It is
assumed that non-faulty processes may observe time at different rates and
processing time is non-negligible, but is bounded by some unknown con-
stant. By using a timeout that grows by 1 each round the following proof
shows that all processes eventually reach a round from which they behave
synchronously.
For the proof we will need to use a mini-round notation and a catch-up
mechanism.
• Mini-round: Each round r is split into two mini-rounds, with the first
mini-round representing lines 03 to M-05 and the second representing
lines (New3) to 12. Thus, round 0 is made up of mini-rounds 0 and
1, round 1 is made up of mini-rounds 2 and 3, and so on. The reason
behind splitting the rounds is so that each mini-round includes a single
execution of the timer.
• Catch-up mechanism: A catch-up mechanism is used to help to the
slow non-faulty processes to catch up to the most advanced non-faulty
processes (as measured by their mini-round number).2 To this end,
when a process is in a mini-round ρ and receives messages correspond-
ing to another mini-round ρ′ from (t+1) different processes (i.e., from
at least one non-faulty process) such that ρ′ > ρ, the process no longer
waits for timers in mini-rounds ρ, .., (ρ′ − 1). It still completes these
mini-rounds, but does so without waiting for timers expiration.
We assume that each process has a local clock that allows it to measure
time units as integers. A process uses its local clock to measure the amount
of time it waits for a timeout (where a timeout of 1 is 1 time unit). The
2Similar mechanisms are used by PBFT [16].
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notation t with a subscript (for example tfirst0) will be used to represent
a time measurement that is given by the number of time units that have
passed since the algorithm started, as measured by an omniscient global
observer G. By 3Synch, processes are able to observe time at different
rates, but within an unknown fixed bound. For simplicity we assume that
the fastest non-faulty process observes time at a rate no faster than observed
by the global observer G, thus all other processes observe time at this rate or
slower. The timeouts used in the following proof are relative to the timeouts
of the fastest process.
Definitions The following definitions will be used in the proofs.
• δ is a fixed, but unknown bound on message transfer delays as ensured
by 3Synch and measured in time units as observed by G.
• tfirstρ is the time, as measured by G, at which the first non-faulty
process pfirstρ reaches mini-round ρ (tfirst0 is the time at which the
first non-faulty process starts the consensus).
• tlastρ is the time, as measured by G, at which the last (i.e. the slow-
est for that mini-round) non-faulty process plastρ reaches mini-round
ρ (tlast0 is the time at which the last non-faulty process starts the
consensus).
• θfast (resp. θslow) is the minimum (resp. maximum) amount of time,
as observed by G, for any process to perform the computation of any
mini-round (an unknown bounded difference between θfast and θslow
is ensured by 3Synch).
• γfastρ is the minimum amount of time, as observed by G, in a mini-
round ρ that any process waits on line New1 or New4 before starting
its timer for that mini-round.
• Mini-round ρδ is the first mini-round where timeout > δ at any non-
faulty process.
The proof is made up of two lemmas. Lemma 10 shows that processes
will eventually reach a point where they remain no more than one mini-
round apart. Lemma 11 builds upon this to show that the rounds eventually
become synchronous.
Lemma 10. Consider the algorithm of Figure 2 enriched with the previous
catch-up mechanism. There is a mini-round ρt such that in ρt and for all
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following mini-rounds all non-faulty processes must wait for at least part of
the timeout, i.e., they do not receive t+1 messages from a mini-round larger
than ρt until after they start waiting for the timeout of mini-round ρt.
Proof Let us consider mini-round ρt where ρt > ρδ. For all non-faulty
processes to wait at a timeout in a mini-round ρt, the last non-faulty process
to arrive at ρt must arrive before it receives a message from some other non-
faulty process that has already started executing a later mini-round (note
that given ρt > ρδ, this can only occur when the non-faulty processes are no
more than 1 mini-round apart). Thus, to satisfy the lemma, a mini-round is
needed where the following inequality holds at that and all following mini-
rounds:
tlastρt < tfirstρt+1 . (1)
To find out when this is satisfied first we will compute the minimum and
maximum times at which non-faulty processes can arrive at a mini-round.
By definition, a non-faulty process can spend no less time than (γfastρ′ +
θfast+timeoutρ′) in a mini-round ρ
′. Given that timeouts start with value 0
in mini-round 0 and grows by 1 in each mini-round, timeout can be replaced
with ρ for any mini-round ρ as a lower bound for the fastest process. We
can then compute the time where the first non-faulty process arrives at
mini-round ρ′ (where ρ′ > ρδ) as:
tfirstρ′ ≥ tfirstρδ +
ρ′−1∑
x=ρδ
γfastx + θfast + x
 .
Notice that from the component
∑ρ′−1
x=ρδ
x (i.e., the timeout), the value of
tfirstρ′ is quadratic in the number of mini-rounds.
Now consider how long it will take the slowest non-faulty process to
execute mini-round ρ′ when it does not wait at a timeout. By definition we
know the process will spend no more time than θslow on computation. Thus,
the remaining time will be spent waiting until the wait until() conditions in
the algorithm are satisfied. We will now examine how much time a non-
faulty process can spend waiting during a mini-round on either line M-05 or
M-07 (we only consider these wait until() conditions as they encompass the
others within a mini-round).
First consider line M-05. Its condition requires (bin values i[ri] 6= ⊥).
Given that the process is not waiting at a timeout, it must have received
(t + 1) messages corresponding to a later mini-round, meaning that some
non-faulty process has already completed ρ′. Furthermore, given that this is
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the slowest non-faulty process, we know that all non-faulty processes have
already executed the BV broadcast() operation on line 04. As we can see
in Figure 7, in the BV broadcast() operation all non-faulty processes will
perform at most 2 broadcast operations. Thus, by the BV-Uniformity prop-
erty, all non-faulty processes will have a value in their bin values i[ri] after at
most 2 message delays following the slowest non-faulty processes invocation
of the BV broadcast(). As a result, the process takes at most 2 × δ + θslow
time to execute the mini-round.
Now consider line M-07. By the time the slowest non-faulty process has
reached this line all non-faulty processes have broadcast their aux messages,
thus the slowest non-faulty process will receive these aux messages in at
most δ time. The process may then need to wait for another message delay
to satisfy all the conditions of line M-07 in the case where a non-faulty
process had a value enter its bin values i[ri] immediately before broadcasting
its aux message (recall that the BV broadcast() may take up to 2 message
delays). Thus, as before, the process takes at most 2 × δ + θslow time to
execute the mini-round.
We then have:
tlastρ′ ≤ tlastρδ +
ρ′−1∑
x=ρδ
2× δ + θslow
 .
Notice that the value of tlastρ′ is linear in the number of mini-rounds.
Now given tfirstρ′ is quadratic while tlastρ′ is linear, inequality (1) must
eventually be satisfied and there will be a mini-round where all non-faulty
processes wait for at least part of their timeout.
It will now be shown that for mini-rounds where timeout > (3×δ+θslow),
once inequality (1) is true, it will remain true for all following mini-rounds.
This will be done by induction. Consider tlastρt < tfirstρt+1 is satisfied, let
us now show that tlastρt+1 < tfirstρt+2 must also be satisfied. For this to not
hold, the slowest non-faulty process must spend more time on mini-round ρt
than the fastest non-faulty process spends on mini-round (ρt + 1), but this
is impossible because once the fastest process completes the condition on
line New1 or New4 and starts its timer, plastρt must receive (t+ 1) messages
from mini-round (ρt+1) after δ time. Once these messages are received, the
process will not wait at any timeout, and as we have already seen, the this
process will take no more than 2×δ+θslow time to complete the mini-round.
Thus, as long as timeout > (3 × δ + θslow), which will eventually be true
given 3Synch and the growing timeout, process plastρt will reach mini-round
(ρt + 1) before pfirstρt+1 reaches mini-round (ρt + 2). 2Lemma 10
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Lemma 11. Consider the algorithm of Figure 2 enriched with the previ-
ous catch-up mechanism. Eventually the non-faulty processes attain a mini-
round from which they behave synchronously.
Proof By Lemma 10 it is known that there exists a mini-round ρt where at
that and all following mini-rounds all non-faulty processes wait for at least
part of their timeout. Additionally, this must happen at some mini-round
where timeout > (3 × δ + θslow). Consider we are in such mini-rounds.
Now for a mini-round to be synchronous, all non-faulty processes need to
arrive at that mini-round with enough time to broadcast their messages to
all non-faulty processes before any non-faulty process moves onto the next
mini-round. In the case that the last non-faulty process to arrive at the
mini-round is the weak coordinator, it may take up to 3 message delays
before its coord value[r]() message is received by all non-faulty processes
(this includes up to 2 message delays until a value enters its bin values[r]
and an additional message delay to broadcast coord value[r]()). Thus,
for a mini-round ρ′t to by synchronous where ρ′t ≥ ρt, the following needs to
be ensured:
tlastρ′t
+ (3× δ) + θslow ≤ tfirstρ′t + γfastρ′t + timeoutρ′t . (2)
Let us now compute tlastρ′t
. First, notice that before a non-faulty process
starts its timer for a mini-round it must wait until the condition on line
New1 or New4 is satisfied. Also note that by time (tfirstρ′t
+ γfastρ′t
+ θfast)
at least one process has satisfied the condition on line New1 or New4 (this
is given by the definition of γ). As a result all processes will receive (t+ 1)
messages from mini-round ρ′t by time (tfirstρ′t
+γfastρ′t
+θfast+δ). Now given
Lemma 10 and that (ρ′t−1) > δ, it is known that that the slowest process is
no further behind than waiting at the timeout of mini-round (ρ′t− 1). After
getting these (t+ 1) messages from mini-round ρ′t the slow process will then
skip the timeout of mini-round (ρ′t − 1) and reach the following mini-round
in at most 2 additional message delays (2 message delays are needed for
the same reasons given in Lemma 10 to satisfy the condition line M-05 or
M-07) plus any processing time. Thus, the time at which the slowest process
reaches mini-round ρ′t is given by:
tlastρ′t
≤ tfirstρ′t + γfastρ′t + θfast + θslow + (3× δ).
Now plugging this into inequality (2) leads to timeoutρ′t ≥ (7 × δ) + (2 ×
θslow)+θfast (note that 2×θslow is included to account for possible processing
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times in both mini-rounds (ρ′t−1) and ρ′t). But given that the timeout grows
in each mini-round and that δ, θfast, and θslow are bound by 3Synch there
will eventually be a mini-round where this holds true.
Finally, notice that as long as the timeout is this large (i.e. timeout ≥
(7×δ)+(2×θslow)+θfast) and Lemma 10 holds then the above argument is
valid for any mini-round. Now given that timeout ≥ (7×δ)+(2×θslow)+θfast
is larger than the timeout needed for Lemma 10 to hold for every following
mini-round, once inequality (2), i.e. synchrony, it true for one mini-round,
it will also hold for every following mini-round. 2Lemma 11
B.4 Proof of the Blockchain Consensus (Figure 3)
Lemma 12. There is at least one binary consensus instance that decides
value 1, and all non-faulty processes exit the repeat loop.
From an operational point of view, this lemma can be re-stated as follows:
there is at least one ` ∈ [1..n] such that at each non-faulty process pi, we
eventually have bin decisions i[`] = 1.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that, at any non-
faulty process pi, no bin decisions i[`], 1 ≤ ` ≤ n, is ever set to 1 (line 12).
It follows that no non-faulty process exits the “repeat” loop (lines 02-04).
As a non-faulty process pj RB-broadcasts a valid value, it follows from the
RB-Termination-1 property, that each non-faulty process pi RB-delivers the
valid proposal of pj , and consequently we eventually have proposals i[j] 6= ⊥
at each non-faulty process pi (line 11).
It follows from the first sub-predicate of line 02 and the RB-Termination-
2 property that all non-faulty processes pi invokes bin propose(−1) on the
BBC object BIN CONS [j] and by line 11, they all BV-deliver 1 to round
one. Notice that by using the RB-delivery to trigger the BV-delivery
of 1 (instead of calling BV broadcast) the lemma relies on the fact that
the properties of RB broadcast also ensure the properties of BV broadcast.
Namely that RB-Termination-1 ensures BV-Obligation, RB-Validity ensures
BV-Justification, and RB-Termination-2 ensures BV-Uniformity and BV-
Termination. It follows that the properties of the binary consensus are main-
tained. Hence, from its BBC-Termination, BBC-Agreement, BBC-Validity,
and Intrusion-tolerance properties (as no non-faulty process has proposed
0), this BBC instance returns the value 1 to all non-faulty processes, which
exit the “repeat” loop.
2Lemma 12
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Lemma 13. A decided value is a valid value (i.e., it satisfies the predicate
valid()).
Proof Let us first observe that, for a value proposals i[j] to be decided by
a process pi, we need to have bin decisions i[j] = 1 (lines 08-10).
If the value 1 is decided by BIN CONS [j], bin decisions i[j] = 1 is even-
tually true at each non-faulty process pi (line 12). If follows from (i) the fact
that the value 1 can only enter the bin values of a BBC instance after vali-
dation at line 11, and (ii) the Intrusion-tolerance property of BIN CONS [j],
that at least one non-faulty process pi inserted 1 into its binvalues on line 12.
Due to line 11, it follows that proposals i[j] contains a valid value. 2Lemma 13
Lemma 14. No two non-faulty processes decide different values.
Proof Let us consider any two non-faulty processes pi and pj , such
that pi decides proposals i[k1] and pj decides proposalsj [k2]. It follows
from line 08 that k1 = min{x such that bin decisions i[x] = 1} and k2 =
min{x such that bin decisionsj [x] = 1}.
On the one hand, it follows from line 07 that (
∧
1≤x≤n bin decisions i[x] 6=
⊥) and (∧1≤x≤n bin decisionsj [x] 6= ⊥), from which we conclude that both
pi and pj know the binary value decided by each binary consensus instance
(line 12). Due to the BBC-Agreement property of each binary consensus
instance, we also have ∀x : bin decisions i[x] = bin decisionsj [x]. Let
dec[x] = bin decisions i[x] = bin decisionsj [x]. It follows then from line 08
that k1 = k2 = min{x such that dec[x] = 1} = k. Hence, dec[k] = 1.
On the other hand, it follows from the Intrusion-tolerance property of
BIN CONS [k] that a non-faulty process p` inserted 1 into its binvalues
on line 12. As this invocation can be issued only at line 03, we conclude
(from the predicate of line 02) that proposals`[k] = v 6= ⊥. As p` is non-
faulty, it follows from the RB-Unicity and RB-Termination-2 properties
that all non-faulty processes RB-delivers v from pk. Hence, we eventually
have proposals i[k] = proposalsj [k], which concludes the proof of the lemma.
2Lemma 14
Lemma 15. Every non-faulty process decides a value.
Proof It follows from Lemma 12 that there is some pj such that we eventu-
ally have bin decisions i[j] = 1 at all non-faulty processes, and no non-faulty
process blocks forever at line 04. Hence, all non-faulty processes invoke
each binary consensus instance (at line 03 or line 06). Moreover, due to
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their BBC-Termination property, each of the n binary consensus instances
returns a result at each non-faulty process (line 12). It follows that no non-
faulty process pi blocks forever at line 07. Finally, as seen in the proof of
Lemma 14, the predicate of line 09 is eventually satisfied at each non-faulty
process, which concludes the proof of the lemma. 2Lemma 15
Theorem 4. The algorithm described in Figure 3 implements multivalued
Byzantine consensus (VPBC) in the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/3,BBC].
Proof Follows from Lemma 13 (VPBC-Validity), Lemma 14 (VPBC-
Agreement), and Lemma 15 (VPBC-Termination). 2Theorem 4
B.5 Complexity
The proposed reduction has constant time complexity.
Lemma 16. When RB broadcast is invoked by a non-faulty process, all non-
faulty processes RB deliver the value in constant time.
Proof Within RB broadcast, a process starts by calling broadcast with a
value, which will then be echoed by all non-faulty processes, resulting in all
processes delivering the value in 3 communication steps. 2Lemma 16
Lemma 17. For any process that RB delivers a value, within a constant
amount of time following this all non-faulty processes have RB deliverd the
value.
Proof For a process to RB deliver a value it must have received the value
from n − t processes, thus t + 1 non-faulty processes have broadcast this
value, which means all non-faulty will echo that value and all non-faulty
will receive the value from n− t processes in at most 2 communication steps
following the first RB delivery. 2Lemma 17
Theorem 5. The reduction presented in figure 3 is a constant time reduc-
tion.
Proof Let us show this by contradiction. Assume a non-faulty process
does not decide in constant time, there are two possibilities how this could
happen, either: (i) the process waits on line 09 for more than constant time,
or (ii) the process has not invoked some instance BIN CONS [k] until after
constant time had already passed.
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First consider (i). Here the process is waiting to RB deliver a value that
by lemma 13 has already been RB deliverd by some non-faulty process, but
by lemma 17 we know this must happen in constant time.
Now consider (ii). By lemma 12 we know that at least one binary consen-
sus instance decides 1. Once this happens all non-faulty processes invoke all
remaining instances of BIN CONS [k] without waiting. Thus, for (ii) to be
true, no instance of BIN CONS [k] must have terminated with 1 in constant
time. But given that at least 2t+1 instances of RB broadcast will be invoked
by non-faulty processes, and given lemma 16, all non-faulty processes will
invoke all instances of BIN CONS [k] in constant time on line 03 or 06.
2Theorem 5
C The BV-broadcast all-to-all communication im-
plementation
Figure 7 depicts the pseudocode of an existing implementation [38] of the
BV-broadcast problem stated in Section 3.1.
operation BV broadcast msg(vi) is
(01) broadcast b val(vi).
when b val(v) is received
(02) if
(
b val(v) received from (t + 1) different processes and b val(v) not yet broadcast
)
(03) then broadcast b val(v) // a process echoes a value only once
(04) if
(
b val(v) received from (2t + 1) different processes
)
(05) then bin valuesi ← bin valuesi ∪ {v}. // local delivery of a value
Figure 7: An algorithm implementing BV-broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3]
(from [37])
D Reliable broadcast in Byzantine systems
This broadcast abstraction (in short, RB-broadcast) was proposed by
G. Bracha [10]. It is a one-shot one-to-all communication abstraction,
which provides processes with two operations denoted RB broadcast()
and RB deliver(). When pi invokes the operation RB broadcast() (resp.,
RB deliver()), we say that it “RB-broadcasts” a message (resp., “RB-
delivers” a message). An RB-broadcast instance, where process px is the
sender, is defined by the following properties.
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• RB-Validity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m from a
non-faulty process px, then px RB-broadcast m.
• RB-Unicity. A non-faulty process RB-delivers at most one message
from px.
• RB-Termination-1. If px is non-faulty and RB-broadcasts a message
m, all the non-faulty processes eventually RB-deliver m from px.
• RB-Termination-2. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m
from px (possibly faulty) then all the non-faulty processes eventually
RB-deliver the same message m from px.
The RB-Validity property relates the output to the input, while RB-
Unicity states that there is no message duplication. The termination prop-
erties state the cases where processes have to RB-deliver messages. The
second of them is what makes the broadcast reliable. It is shown in [11]
that t < n/3 is an upper bound on t when one has to implement such an
abstraction.
Let us remark that it is possible that a value may be RB-delivered by
the non-faulty process while its sender is actually Byzantine and has not
invoked RB broadcast(). This may occur for example when the Byzantine
sender played at the network level, at which it sent several messages to
different subsets of processes, and the RB-delivery predicate of the algorithm
implementing the RB-broadcast abstraction is eventually satisfied for one of
these messages. When this occurs, by abuse of language, we say that the
sender invoked RB-broadcast. This is motivated by the fact that, in this
case, a non-faulty process cannot distinguish if the sender is faulty or not.
The algorithm described in [10] implements RB-broadcast in
BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. Hence, it is t-resilience optimal. This algorithm re-
quires three communication steps to broadcast an application message.
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